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We look at privatization in a general equilibrium model of a small, tariff-distorted, 
open economy. There is a differentiated good produced by both private and public 
sector enterprises. A reduction in government production in order to cut losses from 
such production raises the returns to capital and increases the tariff revenue, which are 
welfare improving. However, privatization also leads to lower wages and possibly 
fewer private brands. This lowers workers’ welfare, which may make privatization 
politically infeasible. Privatization can improve workers’ welfare with complementary 
reforms, e.g., attracting foreign investment or trade liberalization. 
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Discouraged by the poor performance of public sector enterprises (PSEs), 
governments in several developing market economies—e.g., India, Chile, Egypt, 
Mexico, Philippines, Turkey—have attempted to withdraw from the production of 
“private” goods.
1 Does the withdrawal of government from production—which we 
refer to as privatization in the remainder of the paper—improve welfare?   
The proponents of privatization argue that the loss-making PSE should either 
contract or exit and pave the way for efficient private firms, which would increase 
welfare. The opponents, on the other hand, argue that privatization leads to lower 
wages and increased unemployment, which in turn lowers welfare. We assess the 
validity of these claims in a simple two-factor, two-sector, general equilibrium, open 
economy framework where the sector comprising public enterprises and private firms 
is imperfectly competitive.
2 
On examination, both arguments hold an element of truth. We find that 
privatization, if pursued alone, reduces the welfare of the workers. This might make 
privatization politically infeasible in democratic developing economies since workers 
often constitute a majority or the support base of the ruling party. Privatization can, 
however, be politically feasible (i.e., welfare-improving for workers) with 
complementary reforms. For example, an increase in foreign investment in 
conjunction with privatization improves the workers’ welfare. Trade liberalization, 
pursued along with privatization, can improve workers’ welfare under certain 
conditions.
3  
Our analysis, a brief sketch of which is given in section 1.1, contributes to the 
ongoing debate on privatization in developing countries in at least three important 
ways, which we discuss below. Specific contributions are discussed in section 1.2. 
First, although the existing literature on privatization based on a partial equilibrium 
                                                 
1 Various explanations have been offered for the lackluster performance of public enterprises, e.g., a 
distorted incentive structure, the plurality of principals and objectives which often results in 
inefficient utilization of resources, over-employment, and low productivity. There is a vast body of 
empirical literature confirming the inefficiency of public enterprises in developed as well as 
developing countries. See, e.g., Galal et al. (1994) and Majumdar (1998). For a survey of the 
empirical findings, see Megginson and Netter (2001).  
2 The presence of imperfect competition together with increasing returns to scale provide a meaningful 
role of firms. The imperfectly competitive structure is a good description of markets in the less 
developed countries (see Nellis and Kikeri, 1989, p. 663). 
3 It is important to note that in an imperfectly competitive model such as ours, trade liberalization alone 
does not necessarily improve welfare. Nor, for that matter, does capital inflow.  
  1framework (see section 1.2 below for a review of this literature) offers some insights 
into the debate, the effect of privatization on workers’ wages, and more generally on 
factor returns—which lie at the heart of the privatization debate—is missing. By 
explicitly incorporating factor markets for labor and capital into our general 
equilibrium open economy framework, we offer a richer analysis and show that 
indeed, privatization can reduce wages, which in turn can lower welfare.  
Second, most studies on privatization referred to in section 1.2 focus on a short-run 
set up with a fixed number of firms. Hence, they are not well suited to addressing 
another important concern—the effect of privatization on the domestic market 
structure. By explicitly incorporating entry–exit considerations into our framework we 
address this concern and find that a reduction in public sector production does not 
necessarily encourage the entry of private producers. In other words, private 
producers, rather than entering to fill the void created by the contraction of PSEs, 
might exit, which can reinforce (partial) deindustrialization.   
Third, focusing on a tariff-distorted open economy (instead of a closed economy) 
allows us to examine the effect of a combination of policies—e.g., privatization and 
foreign investment, privatization and trade liberalization—which typically comes with 
a reform package. Apart from generating a rich set of possibilities, the open economy 
description is also more realistic. Over the last two decades, developing countries 
embarking on privatization were also usually the ones lowering their tariffs (see Sachs 
and Warner, 1995).
4 By analyzing trade liberalization, privatization, and capital 
inflows in a unified general equilibrium framework, we hope to contribute to a better 
understanding of the complementarities (or the lack thereof) between these policies.  
1.1  A Preview of the Model and Results 
Adapting a monopolistic competitive model along the lines of Venables (1982) and 
Helpman and Krugman (1985), we focus on a small tariff-ridden open economy. It 
produces (and consumes) a homogenous good and a number of differentiated brands, 
and imports a range of foreign brands. The homogenous good, produced under 
                                                 
4 Sachs and Warner (1995) label a country as closed or open based on a combination of criteria (e.g., 
tariff rate, exports to GDP ratio, black market premium etc.). They also provide timings for 
liberalization, i.e., when the countries switched from being closed to open. Their classification shows 
that among the countries (mentioned earlier in the Introduction) which embarked on privatization, 
Chile opened up in 1970s, Mexico, Philippines and Turkey in late 1980s. India qualified as open in 
the mid-1990s. Egypt was the only one never considered as open.  
  2constant returns to scale, is exported whereas the differentiated domestic brands, 
exhibiting increasing returns, are non-traded and are produced by private and public 
sector firms.  
Drawing from the evidence on PSEs, we assume that they differ from their private 
counterparts in terms of the production techniques as well as profit considerations. In 
particular, we assume that a PSE uses the most labor-intensive techniques and can 
remain in the market even if it makes losses. The use of labor-intensive techniques as 
well as excessive employment is a well-known feature of PSEs not only in developing 
countries but also in developed countries. As Boycko et al. (1996) write: “While 
excess employment is not the only politically demanded inefficiency of state firms it 
is surely the most commonly noted one.” Also, for most of the paper, we consider 
only loss-making PSEs, as this argument—that these enterprises make losses and still 
remain in the market—seems to be a critical one leveled against PSEs. Our focus on 
the loss-making PSE is also motivated by the finding in Anderson et al. (1997) that 
privatization improves welfare if PSEs make losses prior to privatization. In our 
framework, although losses are reduced under privatization, this reduction may not be 
enough to offset the loss to welfare from reduced wages. 
Our findings indeed suggest, as the proponents of privatization argue, that 
privatization lowers the losses incurred by public firms, and this is welfare improving. 
However, the opponents of privatization are not wrong either. Ceteris paribus, the 
contraction of the PSE, due to its use of labor-intensive techniques, gives rise to an 
excess supply of labor, which in our full employment model lowers wages. Indeed, 
the situation can be even worse. The excess supply of labor can lead to the contraction 
of the relatively less labor-intensive production, i.e., the production of private 
differentiated goods. In particular, domestic private producers might exit from the 
differentiated goods sector and thus privatization may fail to encourage the entry of 
more private producers—something it was implicitly expected to do. The reduction in 
the number of available varieties (i.e., fewer private brands), combined with lower 
wages implies that unless accompanied by other policies, the privatization program 
will generally reduce the welfare of workers.   
The immiserization of workers poses a problem in terms of political viability of the 
privatization program since in a large number of democratic developing countries, 
workers constitute the majority and/or the support base of the ruling parties. So, even 
if privatization is welfare improving in overall terms (which may not be the case), it 
  3might not be politically viable in the absence of complementary reforms.
5 Are there 
complementary reforms which can be pursued in conjunction with privatization to 
prevent a reduction in workers’ welfare? Given that ours is an open economy model, 
two policy choices seem natural—lowering of trade restrictions and/or encouraging 
foreign investment. Increased capital inflows lead to an increase in the number of 
brands (via the entry of private producers) as well as an increase in wages, which in 
turn improves welfare. Although trade liberalization, by expanding the relatively 
labor-intensive homogenous goods sector, increases wages, it comes at the expense of 
reduced variety. Thus trade liberalization, if pursued along with privatization, 
improves welfare only if the effect of a decline in variety on welfare is not too strong.     
1.2  Related Literature   
Our paper is manifestly related to the trade literature on imperfect competition in 
general, and on monopolistic competition in particular. Though some particular 
aspects of the model—e.g., optimal tariffs (see Venables, 1982) and the welfare 
effects of capital inflows—have been analyzed (see, e.g., Sen et al., 1997; 
Chakraborty, 2001), the introduction of government production in a tractable fashion 
is novel. More importantly, incorporating government production allows us to 
conduct a simultaneous investigation of three important issues—privatization, trade 
liberalization, and foreign investment—which are often mentioned in the same breath 
in the financial press but rarely analyzed in a rigorous unified framework.    
The public economics literature on mixed oligopoly, which typically uses a partial 
equilibrium set up, asks the same question as we do—namely, when does 
privatization improve welfare?
6  This literature offers several reasons why 
privatization might improve welfare. DeFraja and Delbono (1989) show that in the 
                                                 
5 For discussions on the importance of political viability in privatization programs, see World Bank 
(1995).  Also see Clarke and Cull (2005) in this regard. 
6 Apart from the mixed oligopoly literature, there are at least three distinct strands of literature on 
privatization. See Roland (2000) for a comprehensive analysis of privatization in transition 
economies. Despite providing insights that are generally applicable, the absence of markets in the 
pre-transition period makes it difficult to compare the findings across periods, and hence we refrain 
from discussing this literature. We also abstract from the incomplete contract-based literature (see 
Hart et al., 1997; Schmidt 1996) of privatization, which focuses on the incentives arising from 
ownership (private versus public). This brings a new angle to the privatization debate (i.e., 
ownership), which has traditionally focused on market competition. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that 
this is probably more appropriate in the context of the provision of privatization of public goods in 
developed countries (e.g., schools, hospitals, prisons etc.). Finally, there is a third strand of literature 
based on a principal–agent model which focuses on managerial incentives and monitoring problems. 
See, e.g., Barros (1994), De Fraja (1993).      
  4presence of increasing marginal costs (i.e., decreasing returns to scale), privatization, 
by reducing the scale of production of former PSEs, improves production efficiency, 
which can improve welfare. Using a spatial model of product differentiation, Cremer 
et al. (1991) show that the presence of a public firm could result in product 
configuration which is too concentrated. Privatization, by reducing concentration, can 
improve welfare. Building on a Hotelling-duopoly framework and introducing 
endogenous cost differentials between public and private enterprises, Matsumura and 
Matsushima (2004) show that private firms are indeed more efficient than public 
ones. However, the increased efficiency comes at the expense of excessive investment 
in cost-reducing activities. Privatization in their framework improves welfare by 
mitigating the loss arising from excessive cost-reducing investments.  
Anderson et al. (1997) provide an important potential benefit of privatization, 
which only manifests itself in the long run (i.e., with free entry). In the short run, with 
a fixed number of firms, the presence of a public sector firm lowers prices, which 
increases welfare. However, in the long run, the lower prices of public firms act as 
entry deterrent and, consequently, fewer varieties are offered in the market. Anderson 
et al. show that privatization, by increasing the number of varieties, can lead to higher 
welfare provided the public firm was incurring losses (before privatization).
7 Free 
entry of private producers has also been discussed in the context of partial 
privatization in Matsumura and Kanda (2005) and Fujiwara (2007).  Both these works 
show that in the presence of free entry, the results with a fixed number of private 
firms might no longer hold. 
Entry considerations play an important role in our framework as well. But because 
of the absence of factor markets, the framework used in the abovementioned papers 
cannot be used to explore some of the key issues and concerns—e.g., fall in wages 
and/or a rise in unemployment, deindustrialization, conflicts across factor owners—
associated with the privatization programs, especially in developing countries. Our 
two-factor, two-sector, general equilibrium framework, to which we turn now, 
exploits an important channel through which the contraction of the public sector 
works—the economy-wide reallocation of resources and subsequent effects on factor 
returns, entry, and production.  
                                                 
7 The papers on mixed oligopoly discussed here are mainly theoretical in nature. For empirical analysis 
on mixed oligopoly, see Barros and Modesto (1999). They investigate the regulatory role of public 
firm in the Portuguese banking sector, which consists of private as well as public firms.  
  5As far as we are aware, Beladi and Chao (2006)’s is the only paper that considers 
labor market issues in the context of privatization. In considering a dual economy (but 
a closed one), they show that an increase in private ownership leads to an increase in 
urban employment in the short run. In the long run, the unemployment problem 
becomes less severe as capital moves to the rural sector. Unlike their framework, ours 
is a full employment general equilibrium setting. The key difference, however, is that 
ours is an open economy set up in contrast to the closed economy setting considered 
in Beladi and Chao (2006). Considering an open economy allows us to examine the 
role of complementary reforms—trade liberalization and freer capital inflows—in 
generating political support for privatization.    
   
2  The Model 
Consider a small tariff-ridden open economy comprising of L  workers  and d K  
capitalists. Each worker has one unit of labor while each capitalist has one unit of 
capital.
8 The workers and the capitalists have identical preferences.  
2.1  Consumers 
Each individual i maximizes an upper-tier Cobb-Douglas utility function given by 
                    ,       ( 1 )  
α α − =
1
i i i y X U
subject to the budget constraint  
       i i i z PX y = + ,          (2) 
where, yi, Xi, and zi denote, respectively, the amount of individual i’s (i) consumption 
of the (numeraire) homogenous good y, (ii) consumption of an aggregate quantity 
index of differentiated goods X   (whose price is P ), and (iii) income. Apart from 
factor earnings, zi includes a share of tariff revenues (which is rebated to individual i) 
and is net of lump-sum taxes that are used to cover losses (if any) of PSEs.
9   
The quantity index (or alternatively the sub-utility function of the Dixit-Stiglitz 
type) , defined below, captures consumers’ love for variety:     i X
                                                 
8 The assumption that each capitalist owns one unit of capital captures the fact that each capitalist is 
small. However, this assumption is only for simplification and nothing substantial hinges on it.   
9 Since proponents of privatization strongly criticize the existence of loss-making public enterprises, we 
focus on loss-making PSEs and assume that these losses are covered by taxes. In case the public 
enterprises make profits, we assume that profits are rebated to the consumers.     
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where xki,  , and sgi denote, respectively, the amount of individual i’s consumption 
of a domestic private brand k, a foreign brand j, and a public brand g, and σ >1 is the 
elasticity of substitution between brands (below in equations (7) to (9) it is the 
elasticity of demand facing each producer). The number of domestic private brands, 
foreign brands, and public brands are given by n, n,
* and ng respectively. The price 
index corresponding to X is  
*
ji x





















q p p P ,                         (4) 
where , and qg are, respectively, prices of a domestic private brand k, an 
imported brand j, and a government brand g. Note that the price of an imported brand, 
pj
f, is inclusive of tariffs, i.e., pj
f = (1+t)pj
*
  where pj
* is the international price of the 
jth  foreign brand  and t > 0 is the ad-valorem tariff rate. 
f
j k p p ,
The utility maximization exercise (maximizing (1) subject to (2)) followed by 
aggregation across d K L + consumers yields the expenditure shares of the 
homogenous goods and the differentiated goods as follows:  
z y ) 1 ( α − = ,          ( 5 )  
z PX α = ,          ( 6 )  
where y, X, and z denote, respectively, the aggregate consumption of homogeneous 
good, aggregate quantity index of differentiated good, and national income. Next, 
maximizing the sub-utility function Xi, given by (3), subject to the constraint that the 
sum of expenditure on all brands has to be less than or equal to PXi , yields the 
demands for individual brands by each consumer i. Adding all consumers’ demands 
yields the aggregate demand for these brands as follows:  
z P p x k k α
σ σ 1 − − = ,       ( 7 )  
        ,                      (8)  z P p t x j j α
σ σ 1 * * ) ) 1 ((
− − + =
      .       ( 9 )   z P q s g g α
σ σ 1 − − =
Hereafter we will focus on a symmetric equilibrium where each private firm sets 
the same price pk = p, and produces the same amount of output xk = x. The same is 
  7true for foreign varieties, i.e.,   and we assume that government sets sg = s for 
all public brands, which in turn implies qg = q for all g. Following the standard 
practice in the small open economy literature with imperfect competition (see, e.g., 
Venables, 1982; Sen et al., 1997; Chakraborty 2001), we assume that the price and the 
number of foreign brands are exogenously given. In addition, we also assume that the 
number of public brands ng is given. 
* * x x j =
2.2  Firms 
The homogenous good, whose output is denoted by Y, is produced under constant 
returns to scale using labor and capital. Competition, together with the constant 
returns to scale technology, implies the equality between price (unity for the 
numeraire) and marginal cost: 
1 = + r a w a KY LY ,                                        (10) 
where aij denotes the amount of factor i (= L, K) utilized in producing a unit of good j, 
and w and r are, respectively, wages and returns to capital.   
The production of each private brand consists of two components—a variable cost 
and a fixed cost. Both components use a CRS technology (different from the ones 
used in the homogenous goods sector) employing labor and capital. Profit 





− = + p r a w a Kx Lx .                             (11) 
Free entry of private firms in the differentiated goods sector implies that private 
profits are zero in equilibrium. Thus for each private brand, the excess of revenue 




r a w a KF LF = + ,                                    (12) 
where aiF  denotes the amount of factor i (= L, K) used as fixed input. Though each 
component—variable or fixed—exhibits CRS, the presence of the fixed cost itself 
implies the presence of increasing returns to scale in the differentiated goods sector. 










= . This assumption used elsewhere in the literature (see e.g., 
Antras 2003, p. 1382) makes the total cost function homothetic. In particular, using 
  8(11) and (12), this assumption implies that x is constant.  
The profit of a PSE g is given by   
        s ra wa q Ks Ls g ) ( − − = π ,                 (13)    
where  ais denotes the amount of input i (= L, K) employed in the variable cost 
component of s. We make some simplifying assumptions regarding production by the 
PSE for reasons of tractability. First, we omit the fixed cost component in the 
production of public brands. The PSE is not disciplined by the zero profits condition 
and hence the presence of the fixed cost component, although realistic, complicates 
matters unnecessarily. Second, we assume that the PSE uses a Leontief technology, 
i.e., the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital is zero (i.e., the  ’s are 
constant). Neither the absence of the fixed cost component in public brand production 
nor the Leontief specifications are crucial for our analysis. However, these 
assumptions simplify the algebra. Finally, we assume that each PSE produces a fixed 
amount s, and following the observation that PSEs make losses more often than not, 
we assume in the remainder of the paper that 
is a
. 0 < − − Ks Ls ra wa q
10  
One of the most commonly noted features of PSEs is excessive employment. Due 
to the influence of vote-seeking politicians and, in some cases, close ties between the 
union and political parties, labor retrenchment from these enterprises is difficult, if not 
impossible.
11 Following the commonplace observation that PSEs employ a very 
labor-intensive technique, we assume that capital intensity of a public brand is lower 
than that in its private counterpart. Also, since the differentiated goods sector is 
presumably the manufacturing sector of the economy, the capital-intensity of the 
                                                 
10 Two features are worth noting. First, the assumption of fixed s, when interpreted as fixed capacities 
of the PSEs, sounds quite plausible. In fact, under this capacity interpretation, privatization not only 
implies a withdrawal of government production but a credible one. Second, these assumptions—
constancy of s, existence of loss-making PSEs in equilibrium etc.—could be generated from a model 
where each PSE (i) maximizes a weighted average of profit and wage bill and (ii) the factor-
intensities are the same for the fixed cost and the variable cost component. For analytical tractability, 
we treat those features as primitive rather than deriving them from explicit models. On this account, 
the version of our model presented here is probably weaker than the partial equilibrium models 
where PSEs are endowed with an explicit objective function—welfare maximization. Even in those 
models the number of PSEs is typically restricted to one and privatization is modeled as a switch 
from welfare maximization to profit maximization for that single firm. This weakness, however, is 
more than offset by the incorporation of some other important aspects (e.g., difference in factor 
intensities between public and private firms, entry considerations), which shed a new light on the 
analysis of privatization. 
11 The higher labor intensity of PSEs is observed in the developing as well as developed countries. 
Testing for labor intensity of state-owned enterprises listed among the 500 largest non-US firms in 
1975, 1985, and 1995, Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) find that the private firms use significantly 
less labor-intensive processes than state-owned enterprises.  
  9private brands is higher than the capital-intensity of the homogenous good. More 
formally, we assume that for all w, r > 0—which entails positive production in all 














< < . Note that although domestic public brands are least capital 
intensive, unless the share of those brands in total differentiated goods production is 
large, the manufacturing sector still remains more capital intensive compared to the 
exportable sector—a feature that accords well with the trade pattern of developing 
countries.  
Relaxing the assumptions regarding technologies in different sectors—e.g., same 
capital intensities for the fixed and variable cost components in production of private 
brands, Leontief technology in public brands—is not necessary to derive some of the 
main results; neither is the factor-intensity ranking. Under the current factor-intensity 
ranking, wages are lower with privatization and the number of varieties can be lower 
as well—see sections 3.1 and 3.2, respectively. Under an alternative factor-intensity 
ranking, where a homogenous good is most labor intensive and private brands 
continue to be least labor intensive, privatization can still lower wages, but the 
number of private brands increases following privatization. However, unless σ is too 
close to unity, the central results of the paper—e.g., a worker’s welfare is lower with 
privatization, an increased capital inflow (along with privatization) leads to 
improvement in a worker’s welfare—can continue to hold.  
2.3  Market Clearing Equations 
The market clearing equations for labor and capital, respectively, are given by  
L s n a n a nx a Y a g Ls LF Lx LY = + + +                                         (14) 
f d g Ks KF Kx KY K K s n a n a nx a Y a + = + + + ,                            (15) 
whereL and  d K are aggregate labor and domestic capital respectively in the economy. 
Given the paucity of domestic capital in small, tariff-ridden, developing economies, 
we assume, quite realistically, that the economy also employs foreign capital ( f K ).
12 
In addition to the factor-market clearing equations, we have conditions (7), (8), and 
                                                 
12 We think of the amount of foreign capital as being exogenously given—it is more like a policy 
parameter. While this can be relaxed (e.g., by making it responsive to r), it is arguably a feature of 
the countries that pursued an inward-looking industrialization policy. 
  10(9) which are the market clearing conditions for the private domestic brands, foreign 
brands, and public brands, respectively. Together, equations (7)–(9), (14), and (15) 
imply that trade is balanced,
13 i.e.,  
* * * x p n y Y = − .                  (16) 
The national income for this small open economy, denoted by z, is given by 
z
* * *   x p tn n K r L w g g d + + + = π , or equivalently by                                          
* * * ) ( ) ( x p tn qs n s n a K r s n a L w z g g Ks d g Ls + + − + − = .         (17) 
Hereafter, we use L and K to denote the amount of labor and domestic capital 
employed in non-public production,
14  i.e.,  s n a L L g Ls − =  and s n a K K g Ks d − = , 
respectively. This completes the specification of the model.  
 
3  Privatization 
We model privatization
15 as a reduction in the production of public brands, and 
explore its welfare consequences. Since both ng and s are fixed in our model, 
privatization, i.e., reduction of government production, can be modeled either as a 
reduction in ng or a reduction in s. Qualitatively, both exercises give similar results 
and here we report the findings for the latter (i.e., reduction in s).
16  
To facilitate the analysis, we express the equations as well as the comparative 
statics results in terms of proportionate changes (e.g., x dx x d x / ln ˆ = = ). 
Differentiation of (10), (11), and (12) gives, respectively,  
0 ˆ ˆ = + r w KY LY θ θ ,                    (18)   
p r w Kx Lx ˆ ˆ ˆ = +θ θ ,                      (19) 
and  
                                                 
13 Thus this country produces some brands of the differentiated good but these are non-traded. This we 
believe is also a feature of countries that followed an inward-looking industrialization policy. 
14 We assume that K is strictly positive. This implies that private firms produce domestic brands even 
in the absence of foreign capital.  
15 The term “privatization” has been used to describe a variety of situations, with the common theme 
being reduced government intervention in production, or a complete sale of state-owned enterprises. 
See Megginson and Netter (2001) for a comprehensive discussion on this issue.  
16 Thus privatization means the government is “vacating space” for private production by reducing its 
sales and by releasing factors of production.
  Modeling privatization as a reduction in ng would imply 
additional losses to the consumers due to fewer public brands. By treating a reduction in s as 
privatization, we abstract from this source of welfare loss. However, as our analysis shows, 
privatization can reduce workers’ welfare even if ng does not decline.  
  11               x p r w KF LF ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ + = +θ θ ,                     (20)   
where ij θ   is the share of the factor i  in production of output j as a proportion of 
marginal cost.  
Recall that we assumed the capital intensities in the fixed and the variable 
components of the production are identical (i.e., θix = θiF,  i = L, K), which  implies 
 (from (19) and (20)). Thus the scale of the private firm’s production does not 
change with privatization, which implies that any change in aggregate production of 
the private brands is determined solely by entry–exit considerations. Solving for  
and 
0 ˆ = x
w ˆ
r ˆfrom (18) and (19), in terms of  , together with the factor-intensity ranking, 
yields the Stolper-Samuelson effects: an increase in price of the private domestic 
brands raises the returns to capital—the factor intensively employed in the production 
of private brands:  
p ˆ


























Logarithmic differentiation of the factor-market clearing equations, followed by 
suitable substitutions from (21) gives: 




Ls LF Lx LY ˆ ˆ ˆ ) ( ˆ
θ θ
ε θ γ
γ γ γ γ
−
− = + + +
∑
,               (22)
  




Ks KF Kx KY ˆ ˆ ˆ ) ( ˆ
θ θ
ε θ γ
γ γ γ γ
−
= + + +
∑
,             (23) 
where γij is the physical share of factor i in j ∈ {Y,x,F,s} and εj is the elasticity of 
substitution in production line j.  
Further, differentiation of the price index (equation 4) and national income identity 
(equation 17) gives:  
      q p n P ˆ ˆ ˆ
1
1 ˆ




= ,                 (24) 
             ,                   (25)  ) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ ) ˆ ˆ ( ) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ
* q s x K r L w z pub t r w + + + + + + = λ λ λ λ
where β1, β2 and (1-β1 - β2) are the shares of domestic brands, public brands, and 
foreign brands, respectively, in total expenditure on the differentiated good (PX), and 
  12λw, λr, λpub, λt respectively denote the shares of (i) wage income (wL), (ii) domestic 
capital income (rK), (iii) revenues earned by the public sector (ngsq), and (iv) tariff 
revenue (tn
*p*x
*), in national income. Note that the factor shares λw and λr correspond 
to the earnings from the factors employed in the production of the non-public sector 
(comprising private differentiated goods and the homogenous good sector).  
Differentiation of the goods-market clearing conditions with suitable substitutions 
from (21), (24), and (25), in the resultant expressions yield  
s B n p A ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 = − β .                 (26) 
The expressions for A and B are given in (A10) and (A11) respectively in the 
Appendix. When the public sector makes losses—as we assume in our analysis—B is 
positive. Exploiting the fact  that the share of foreign brands in total domestic 
expenditure on differentiated goods (1 – β1 – β2 ≡ n
*p
*(1+t)x
*/αz)  is higher than the 
share of tariff revenue in national income (λt ≡ tn
*p
*x
*/z), we also show that A is 
negative.  
3.1  Product and Factor Prices  
How does privatization, modeled as a reduction in s, affect the prices in our 
framework? Proposition 1 discusses the effect of privatization on product prices and 
Proposition 2 examines the effect of privatization on wages and returns to capital. 
 
Proposition 1: Privatization raises the prices of domestic brands—private as well as 
public.  
Proof:  Solving equations (22), (23), and (26) (see Appendix) gives  
           
Δ
− + + − +
=
] [ )] ( ) ( [
ˆ
ˆ 1 Ks LY KY Ls LF Lx KY KF Kx LY B
s
p γ γ γ γ β γ γ γ γ γ γ
,              (27) 
where
] [ )] ( ) ( [ 1
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− + − + = Δ
∑ ∑
. 
First, consider the sign of Δ. As mentioned earlier, (i) A < 0. Also since the 
production of homogenous good Y is relatively more labor intensive compared to x 
(and  F), we have (ii) Lx LY θ θ − > 0 and (iii) ) ( ) ( LF Lx KY KF Kx LY γ γ γ γ γ γ + − + >0.  
Together, (i), (ii), and (iii) imply ∆ < 0. Now, consider the numerator. The labor 
intensity in s is higher than that in Y, which gives (iv) 0 > − LY Ks KY Ls γ γ γ γ . Using (iii), 






 < 0.  
Now consider the effect of privatization on the price of public brands. Log 























  < 0.                      Q.E.D. 
A reduction in s affects the price of the public brand q through in two ways. First, 
there is a direct effect of a reduction in the supply of s, which increases its price (q).  
In addition, an increase in price of the private brands (p) due to privatization induces 
consumers to demand more of the public brand—an imperfect substitute of the private 
ones. This creates an excess demand for the public brand, which in turn puts an 
upward pressure on q. Thus, on both counts—reduced supply of public brands and 
increased price of private brands—privatization leads to an increase in the price of the 
public brand. 
 
Proposition 2:  Privatization lowers wages and increases the returns to capital. 






















) while (i) and (iii) 






).               Q.E.D 
The public sector uses the most labor-intensive (least capital-intensive) techniques. 
Hence, a contraction in the public sector creates an excess supply of labor and excess 
demand for capital, which in turn puts downward pressure on wages and upward 
pressure on the returns to capital. Thus wages decline and the returns to capital 
increase due to privatization.   
3.2  Number of Varieties  
Ours is a small open economy model, and, accordingly, the number of foreign brands 
is exogenously given (see Venables, 1982 and Sen et al., 1997 for a rationalization of 
  14the assumption). Hence, to determine the effects of privatization on the number of 
varieties available to consumers, it is sufficient to examine the effect of privatization 
on the number of domestic brands produced.  
 
Proposition 3:  Privatization reduces the number of domestic varieties for low 
elasticities of substitution in production. 
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Lx LY
j
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s
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γ γ γ γ
.                 (29) 
From the proof of Proposition 1 we already know that Δ < 0, A  < 0, and 






.            Q.E.D. 
There are two effects at work here. Given that the public sector uses the least 
capital-intensive techniques, the decline of the public sector means that the ratio of 
available capital to available labor for the non-public sectors declines as well. At 
given prices, this implies that the capital-intensive sector among the non-public ones, 
i.e., the differentiated goods sector, contracts. Thus, at given prices, a reduction in 
government production induces an exit of private domestic firms. However, prices are 
not fixed. Proposition 1 showed that privatization raises the price of the domestic 
private brand which encourages entry into the differentiated goods sector, suggesting 
that the differentiated goods sector would expand following privatization. For low 
elasticities of substitution (in production), the effect operating through the price 
channel is weak, which in turn gives the result (mentioned in Proposition 3).  
Anderson et al. (1997) show that privatization of a public firm—modeled as a 
switch from welfare maximization to profit maximization as the objective function—
increases not only the number of private brands but also the total number of brands. In 
contrast, we find that when private and public firms use different technologies (as 
they often do in reality), privatization can lead to the exit of private firms from the 
differentiated goods sector. In addition to increased product prices and lower wages, 
now there is one more source of welfare loss from privatization —fewer domestic 
  15varieties.
17  
3.3  Tariff Revenues and Public Sector Losses 
According to the proponents of privatization, an important benefit of privatization 
comes from the reduced losses of PSEs (which translates into lower taxes). Our 
analysis lends support to that view. In addition, by increasing imports, privatization 
leads to an increase in tariff revenue. 
 
Proposition 4: Privatization increases the tariff revenues and lowers the losses 
incurred by PSEs. 
Proof:  Log differentiating (7) and (8), and rearranging subsequently gives (see 
derivation of A5 in the Appendix)
 










σ =  < 0.    
Thus imports (i.e., x
*) increase with privatization, which in turn implies that the 
tariff revenues increase with privatization.  
Recall that the profit of a PSE producing a fixed amount s is 
s ra wa q Ks Ls g ) ( − − = π . Given that the PSE makes losses prior to privatization 
(i.e., ), a reduction in s directly increases 0 < − − Ks Ls ra wa q g π .Privatization increases 
q (Proposition 1), which increases g π . Using (21) and Proposition 1, it is easy to show 
that  declines with privatization. This also increases  Ks Ls ra wa + g π .         Q.E.D 
 
4  Political Support for Privatization  
Support for any reform comes from those who stand to gain from the reforms. Our 
analysis suggests that the capitalists—both domestic and foreign—benefit from higher 
returns to capital following privatization (see Proposition 2). Thus capitalists are 
likely to support privatization unless the loss from the reduction in the number of 
varieties is large.  
                                                 
17 A reduction in the number of brands from the free entry level can improve welfare by economizing 
on entry costs and lowering the average cost (if there are economies of scale). In a homogenous 
product oligopoly, Mankiw and Whinston (1986) and Suzumura and Kiyono (1987) have shown that 
entry regulation can indeed improve welfare. However, under Dixit-Stiglitz preferences (capturing 
love for variety) and a reduction in the number of brands lowers welfare.  
  16Since imports increase with privatization, foreign firms will support privatization 
as well. In addition, the revenue-constrained governments—a feature that we abstract 
from but which is often the case in developing countries—are likely to be supportive 
of privatization as it raises tariff revenues.
18 If foreign firms are influential in 
domestic policies or if the political scenario is such that governments can ignore the 
wishes of the majority (i.e., workers in this case), then, once again, privatization can 
be successfully implemented.   
However, in several countries undertaking or willing to undertake privatization, 
workers, due to their sheer numbers, play an important role. This suggests that at least 
in democracies with a significant involvement of PSEs (e.g., India, Turkey), a 
precondition for privatization to be politically viable is that the workers are not worse 
off.
19   
Remarks: Although we focus on the welfare effects of privatization on workers, 
except when we consider factor returns, the interests of capitalists and workers are 
aligned. For example, both capitalists and workers are adversely affected by an 
increase in domestic brand prices (see Proposition 1) and a possible decline in the 
number of varieties consumed (see Proposition 2). Indeed, if workers are better off 
with privatization, capitalists are also better off, although the reverse is not true. 
Second, one might ask why improvement in workers’ welfare is considered in 
isolation. After all, if privatization improves welfare, then surely some transfers can 
be arranged so that the workers are as well off as without privatization. However, it is 
precisely because those transfers are highly costly and distortionary that the 
governments in these countries resort to direct production of manufacturing output in 
the first place. Third, the standard political economy models assume that each 
individual is endowed with one unit of labor and differential amounts of capital. 
Political support depends on whether the median voter’s welfare improves with 
privatization. Here we assume that workers are identical and have no capital. While it 
might seem extreme, the assumption is not far from reality in the developing 
                                                 
18 There is a direct increase in government revenues from the sale of PSEs, which we do not focus on 
here. Our analysis shows that there is also an indirect channel through which the government’s 
revenues could increase—through increased imports subject to tariffs.   
19 Although we focus on the welfare of workers alone, the fact that these workers are considered 
identical places our model somewhere between a political economy model (with differential 
endowments among individuals) and the canonical welfare maximizing social planner who puts 
equal weights on utilities of all individuals. See Dutt and Mitra (2002) for a simple political economy 
model in an open economy context. Baland and Francois (2005) look at privatization in the presence 
of a commons and find that privatization may increase efficiency but reduce welfare. 
  17economies—the median individual in these countries has little or no capital.   
Now we turn to the effect of privatization on workers’ welfare. Let Vw denote the 
indirect utility of the representative worker. For simplicity, we assume now that the 
tariff revenues are returned to the workers while taxes (if any) are paid by the 
capitalists.  
 
Proposition 5: If (i) the share of tariff revenue in workers’ income and (ii) the 
elasticities of substitution production are low, privatization reduces workers’ welfare.   
Proof: The utility maximization exercise in (1), together with the fact that the 
workers’ income consists of wages and tariff revenues alone, gives  
α α α α α
− − + − = P
L
x p tn
w Vw ) ( ) 1 (
* * *
1 . 
Differentiating logarithmically and rearranging yields 




























+ − − − + =
σ
αβ
αβ αβ μ μ ,                       (30)  
where μ denotes the share of wages in a worker’s income. 












. Proposition 2 says that privatization lowers 






. In addition, if elasticities of substitution are low in production, 






). Then, from (30) it follows 





> 0. Privatization benefits workers only 






<0). If the share 
of tariff revenue in workers’ income (i.e., 1-μ) is small, then the conclusion obtained 





> 0.                     Q.E.D 
Though the wages are lower and the prices (of domestic brands) are higher with 
privatization, the number of varieties might be more or less depending on the 
elasticities of substitution in production—see the discussion in section 3.3. The low 
elasticities (e.g., Leontief technology) ensure that the number of varieties decline with 
privatization, which adds to the welfare loss arising from lower wages and higher 
  18prices. Even if the elasticity of substitutions are large and consequently the number of 
varieties increases following privatization, the workers’ welfare will still generally be 
lower with privatization due to lower wages and higher prices. However, for low 
values of σ (the elasticity of substitution between the various brands), which implies a 
very strong love for variety, it is possible that the welfare gains from the increased 
number of varieties outweigh the welfare losses from the other sources. 
Remark: Following the literature on small open economy models of monopolistic 
competition, we have assumed that the number of imported varieties is exogenously 
given. With an endogenous number of foreign varieties, privatization can lead to an 
increase in the number of foreign brands since domestic brands become more 
expensive with privatization. This suggests a reduction in the overall number of 
varieties and consequently the welfare loss is less when the number of imported 
varieties is endogenously determined. Although this partially offsets the negative 
impact of privatization, it is unlikely to outweigh the welfare loss arising from a 
reduction in wages. 
 
5  Complementary Reforms 
Since the capitalists and the foreign firms gain from privatization, complementary 
reforms are not necessary in order to implement privatization if these groups are 
influential in the policy making. However, if workers’ welfare is the central concern, 
then privatization alone will not be politically viable. Does that mean privatization, as 
a goal, is unattainable in democratic developing economies? The answer is no 
according to the analysis in this section. Although privatization, pursued alone, can 
reduce workers’ welfare, there are complementary policies which, if undertaken along 
with privatization, can offset the welfare loss. Given that ours is a tariff-ridden open 
economy, we consider two policy interventions, which are absent in a closed economy 
model—namely, an increase in foreign investment and a reduction in the tariff rate.  
 
5.1  Foreign Investment 
Recall from section 4 that the workers are better off with privatization if and only if 
the following holds (see equation 30): 



































αβ αβ μ μ , 



































KY w .   (31) 
Amending (23) to incorporate proportional changes in foreign capital and then 
solving (22), (23), and (26) gives (see the Appendix)    





















,                            (32a) 





















,                (32b) 
where f denotes the foreign share in the total capital employed in the economy, ∆ < 0 






















 denote, respectively, the effect of  
privatization on the number of varieties and the price, in the absence of other policy 
interventions—these are given by (29) and (27) in section 3. Substituting (32a) and 
(32b) in (31), and defining  
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0. Assume that μ is large—the share of wages in a worker’s overall income is large. 
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Lx LY
KY is positive. Then from (32a) and 
(32b) respectively it follows that if foreign investment is increased along with 
  20privatization, the number of domestic varieties increases and prices decline, both of 
which reduce the welfare losses which arise when privatization alone is implemented. 
Indeed, given A and ∆ are negative, (33) implies that an increase in foreign investment 





K f ) for an improvement in workers’ welfare. 





) required to neutralize the welfare 







Proposition 6: Privatization, combined with suitable increases in foreign investment, 
increases workers’ welfare.  
Proof: Follows from the discussion above. 
 
To understand Proposition 6, note that an increase in foreign investment has two 
welfare-improving effects. First, it leads to an increase in the number of domestic 
private brands—the capital-intensive sector in our framework. Second, an increased 
supply of foreign capital leads to higher wages. Since wages and brand prices are 
negatively related—via the Stolper-Samuelson effect—prices are also lower. Both 
these effects raise welfare.  
It might seem that an increase in foreign capital is unambiguously welfare 
improving, with or without privatization. However, that is not necessarily the case. In 
a small open economy with perfect competition, several authors (including Johnson, 
1967 and Bhagwati, 1968) have shown that an inflow of foreign capital could 
immiserize the recipient economy in the presence of tariffs in a large number of 
scenarios. Indeed, Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro (1977) showed that an inflow of 
foreign capital is necessarily immiserizing, if the import-competing sector is capital 
intensive and foreign capital income is repatriated in full.
20 The import-competing 
differentiated goods sector is indeed capital intensive (ignoring the public firm) in our 
framework and focusing on workers’ welfare alone makes our model akin to a set up 
where the capital income accrues entirely to foreigners. However, in the presence of 
                                                 
20 Grinols (1991) provides an example in a Harris-Todaro framework where immiserization does not 
occur.  
  21imperfect competition in the import-competing sector—which is true for our 
framework—the immiserization is unlikely to hold.  
 
5.2  Trade Liberalization 
Now consider combining trade liberalization with privatization. Note that in a model 
such as ours, trade liberalization by itself is welfare reducing since it causes an exit 
from the domestic differentiated goods sector (see, e.g., Venables, 1982). 
Incorporating trade liberalization (i.e., a reduction in tariff rate t) in the presence of 
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We know Δ > 0 and  Lx LY θ θ − > 0. In the Appendix, we derive the expression for C 
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 > 0. 
  22The second term on the right-hand side of (36) captures the direct effect of a reduction 
in tariff rates. A reduction in tariff rates directly benefits the consumers by lowering 
the price index. However, tariff reductions also lower tariff revenues. The former 
beneficial effect (i.e., lower prices) dominates the latter as long as 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 1 μ β β α − − − −
( ) ( Lx KY KF Kx LY
(1+1/t) > 0—which holds if the share of rebated tariff revenue 
in a worker’s overall income is small (i.e., μ is large). We had assumed this to be the 
case. 
The third term on the RHS of (36) captures the effect of tariffs on the prices of 
domestic brands and consequently on welfare. Since C > 0, ∆ < 0, from (35b) it 
follows that an increase in the price of the domestic brand following privatization is 
less if tariff rates are simultaneously lowered. Also, since 
) LF γ γ γ γ γ γ − + +   > 0 and  σ μ β β α
θ θ
μθ
) 1 ( ) ( 2 1 − − + +
− Lx LY
KY   > 0, (36) 
implies that welfare increases because of the drop in the prices of domestic private 
brands. Note that the lower prices of private brands not only benefit consumers 
directly, but, as discussed in section 3.1, also through a reduction of prices of public 
brands, and by raising wages. 
Though there are gains from trade liberalization due to higher wages and lower 
prices of foreign and domestic private brands, the number of varieties is reduced with 















—see (35a). The reasoning is simple. With trade 
liberalization, the exportable sector producing the homogenous good expands whereas 
the import-competing sector producing differentiated brands contracts, and 
accordingly the number of domestic private brands decline. The reduction in the 
number of private brands, n, raises the price index and lowers welfare. Note that 
(from (36)) the magnitude of the adverse welfare effect of trade liberalization is large 
only when (a) elasticities of substitution in production (εi) are large or (b) brands are 
too differentiated (σ close to unity).
21 However, with large elasticities of substitution 
the number of brands actually increases with privatization alone and hence unless (b) 
                                                 
21 Note that for high elasticities of substitution in production, the number of varieties might actually 
increase with privatization—see Proposition 3. Hence although trade liberalization alone lowers the 
number of varieties, considering the overall effect, the number of varieties for privatization cum 
liberalization is likely to increase from the pre-privatization level. This suggests that with high values 
of elasticities of substitution in production, trade liberalization is likely to improve workers’ welfare.    
  23is violated, the negative impact on welfare is small
22 and consequently the beneficial 
effects of trade liberalization—lower prices, higher wages—dominate. 
 
Proposition 7: Privatization combined with trade liberalization increases workers’ 
welfare provided the brands are not too differentiated (i.e., σ is not close to unity). 
Proof: Follows from the discussion above. 
 
These two propositions, i.e., Propositions 6 and 7, suggest that the proponents of 
privatization are not wrong either. In fact, in order to achieve a politically viable 
privatization, governments need to undertake reforms in other arenas as well—in our 
case, trade and capital accounts.  
 
6  Conclusion 
Prompted by poor performance and widespread inefficiencies, governments in several 
developing countries have attempted to withdraw from the manufacturing sector, in 
which it used to have a significant share both in terms of output and employment.  
What are the welfare consequences of such a retreat? We attempted to address this 
question by embedding public sector production—characterized by labor-intensive 
techniques and a lack of market discipline (these firms continue to produce even if 
profits are negative)—in a general equilibrium model with imperfect competition. 
Although there is a small body of work incorporating the government provision of 
public goods in the trade literature, direct government production does not seem to 
have received much attention.   
Our findings suggest that privatization may have several benefits. It reduces losses 
of the PSEs, raises the returns to capital, and increases the tariff revenue—all of 
which improve welfare. However, due to the use of labor-intensive techniques, a 
shrinking of the public sector might create unemployment or in a full-employment 
model like ours, lower wages. More surprisingly, we find that if elasticities of 
substitution are low in production, private brands producers, rather than filling up the 
void created through the contraction of the public sector, might actually exit. Fewer 
                                                 
22 This is reflected in (34) where (σ -1) is in the denominator of the coefficient of  .  s n ˆ / ˆ
 
  24brands together with lower wages reduce the welfare of workers. This suggests that 
pursuing privatization alone might be politically costly.      
According to our model, to do it right—i.e., to privatize without immiserizing the 
workers—requires complementary reforms. In particular, the government needs to 
provide suitable incentives and an environment to attract foreign investment into the 
country. This stands in sharp contrast to findings from perfectly competitive trade 
models where capital inflow in a tariff-distorted economy, with a capital-intensive 
importable sector, reduces welfare. Trade liberalization (also welfare-reducing by 
itself in presence of imperfect competition), if pursued along with privatization 
improves workers’ welfare only if there is not much differentiation—which is true if 




1. Derivation of (26)    
 
Differentiating (7), (8), and (9) respectively yield:  
z P p ˆ ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ 0 + − + − = σ σ ,                            (A1) 
z P x ˆ ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ
* + − = σ ,                                    (A2) 
and 
z P q s ˆ ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ ˆ + − + − = σ σ .                  (A3) 
 
Subtracting (A1) from (A3) gives  





ˆ ˆ − = ,               (A4) 
and subtracting (A1) from (A2) yields 
p x ˆ ˆ
* σ = .                             (A5) 
Recall that L and K denote the labor and capital employed in private production 
(differentiated and homogeneous goods combined). Totally differentiating the two 
identities— s n a L L g Ls − ≡  and  s n a K K g Ks d − ≡  respectively—and rearranging gives 
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where  d g Ls K K L s n a L L / , / , / 1 2 1 = = = ϕ φ φ  and  d g Ks K s n a / 2 = ϕ . Substituting (21) 
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).  In particular, the expression is negative for loss-making 
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Substituting (A4) into (24) and multiplying both sides by σ - 1 gives     
   s p n P ˆ )
1
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β β β σ β σ − − + − + − = − .              (A9) 
Substituting (A8) and (A9) into (A1) and rearranging gives equation (26) 
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2. Signs of A and B 
Rearranging  (A10) we find that  
() ) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 1 t pub t
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Noting that  r w pub t λ λ λ λ + = − − 1 and simplifying further gives the following: 
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Since the production of private brands (i.e., x) uses the least labor-intensive 
techniques, it follows that θLY - θLx > 0 and θLx/θKx < λw/λr. These observations, 
together with the fact that 
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0—see the paragraph following (A8). 
 
3. Derivations of (27) and (29) 



























































































Then, applying Cramer’s rule (27) and (29) follows. 
 
4. Derivations of (32a) and (32b) 







= . Amending (23) to incorporate proportional changes in foreign 
investment (denoted by f K ˆ ), the three equations—(22), (23), and (26)—can be put in 
the matrix form as follows:  
    

























































































Applying Cramer’s rule, (32a) and (32b) follows.  
 
5.  Derivations of (35a) and (35b) 
Note that T = (1+t) where t > 0 is the ad-valorem tariff rate on imports. Let T ˆ  denote 
the proportionate change in T (i.e., T ˆ  = d ln T). Incorporating T ˆ , equations (24), (25), 
and (A2) respectively will be modified as  
             T q p n P ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ ˆ ˆ
1
ˆ
2 1 2 1
1 β β β β
σ
β
− − + + +
−
= ,            (A12) 
                                    ,    (A13)  ) ˆ ˆ ( ) ˆ ˆ ( ) ˆ ˆ ( ) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ
* q s x t K r L w z pub t r w + + + + + + + = λ λ λ λ
and  
     .                (A14)  z P T x ˆ ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ ˆ
* + − + − = σ σ
Subtracting (A1) from (A14) yields 
) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ
* T p x − =σ .                         (A15) 
Substituting (A12), (A13), and (A15) into (A1) yields 
s B T C n p A ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 = + − β                 (A16) 
where A and B are as in (A10) and (A11) respectively, while  
) 1 )( 1 ( 2 1 t
t
t
C λ β β σ
λ
− − − − + = .                      (A17) 
Since  t λ β β − − − 2 1 1 > 0 it follows that C is positive.  
Equations (22), (23), and (A16) can be written in the matrix form as follows: 
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